Characterising Cheque Dishonour Cases in India: Causes for Delays and Policy Implications

52 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2022 Last revised: 19 Apr 2022

See all articles by Devendra Damle

Devendra Damle

National Institute of Public Finance and Policy

Karan Gulati

Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy

Jitendra Madaan

Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Delhi - Department of Management Studies

Manish Singh

Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee

Nikhil Borwankar

Independent

Date Written: April 13, 2022

Abstract

Cheque-dishonour cases constitute a significant portion of litigation in India. These cases are thought to be major contributors to overall pendency and delays in courts. The Supreme Court of India, in 2020, set up a committee and appointed Amici Curiae to formulate recommendations to reduce delays in cheque-dishonour cases. The recommendations target certain aspects of cheque-dishonour cases, however, empirical evidence supporting these recommendations is lacking. In this study we present an empirical analysis of the impact of six major characteristics of cases, which are the targets of the Supreme Court Committee and Amici Curiae’s recommendations. We find that many of the recommendations — more summary trials, clarifying jurisdictions, ensuring presence of the accused, reducing multiplicity of proceedings, and increasing the number of courts — may indeed reduce the delays in cheque-dishonour cases. However, the recommendation to encourage more mediation is likely to cause more delays instead of reducing them. We thus demonstrate the importance of using empirical analysis to underpin important policy decisions in judicial procedure.

Keywords: Negotiable Instruments Act, cheque dishonour, empirical judicial studies

JEL Classification: K41, K39, K40, K20

Suggested Citation

Damle, Devendra and Gulati, Karan and Madaan, Jitendra and Singh, Manish and Borwankar, Nikhil, Characterising Cheque Dishonour Cases in India: Causes for Delays and Policy Implications (April 13, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4082939 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4082939

Devendra Damle (Contact Author)

National Institute of Public Finance and Policy ( email )

18/2, Satsang Vihar Marg
New Delhi, 110067
India

Karan Gulati

Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy ( email )

New Delhi
India

Jitendra Madaan

Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Delhi - Department of Management Studies ( email )

Hauz Khus
New Delhi, 110016
India

Manish Singh

Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee ( email )

Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Roorkee, UT Uttarakhand 247667
India

HOME PAGE: http://https://hs.iitr.ac.in/

Nikhil Borwankar

Independent ( email )

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