Learning Through Imitation: an Experiment

48 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2022

See all articles by Marina Agranov

Marina Agranov

California Institute of Technology

GABRIEL LOPEZ-MOCTEZUMA

California Institute of Technology

Philipp Strack

Yale University

Omer Tamuz

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 13, 2022

Abstract

We compare how well agents aggregate information in two repeated social learning environments. In the first setting agents have access to a public data set. In the second they have access to the same data, and also to the past actions of others. Despite the fact that actions contain no additional payoff relevant information, and despite potential herd behavior, free riding and information overload issues, observing and imitating the actions of others leads agents to take the optimal action more often in the second setting. We also investigate the effect of group size, as well as a setting in which agents observe private data and others’ actions.

Keywords: social learning, repeated game, laboratory experiment

JEL Classification: D83, C92

Suggested Citation

Agranov, Marina and LOPEZ-MOCTEZUMA, GABRIEL and Strack, Philipp and Tamuz, Omer, Learning Through Imitation: an Experiment (April 13, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4083318 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4083318

Marina Agranov (Contact Author)

California Institute of Technology ( email )

Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~magranov/

GABRIEL LOPEZ-MOCTEZUMA

California Institute of Technology ( email )

Philipp Strack

Yale University ( email )

493 College St
New Haven, CT CT 06520
United States

Omer Tamuz

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

1200 East California Blvd.
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

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