CEO Marital Status and Corporate Cash Holdings

Elnahas, A., Md Noman H, and Siamak J., CEO marital status and corporate cash holdings, European Financial Management, Forthcoming

53 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2022 Last revised: 9 Jan 2023

See all articles by Ahmed Elnahas

Ahmed Elnahas

The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley

Md Noman Hossain

Central Washington University - College of Business

Siamak Javadi

University of Texas - Rio Grande Valley

Date Written: January 8, 2023

Abstract

We examine the effect of CEO marital status on corporate cash holdings. Consistent with the classical agency framework, we find that firms with single CEOs hold more cash compared to otherwise similar firms with married CEOs and that the excess cash held by single CEOs is significantly discounted by shareholders. Our findings survive a battery of tests to ease endogeneity and selection bias, confirming that results are not simply reflecting innate heterogeneity in preferences. Overall, our findings indicate that a variable outside the common firm- and macro-level determinants, CEO marital status, can significantly influence corporate policies.

Keywords: Cash Holdings; Marital Status; CEO; Tobin’s Q

JEL Classification: G30, G32, G35

Suggested Citation

Elnahas, Ahmed and Hossain, Md Noman and Javadi, Siamak, CEO Marital Status and Corporate Cash Holdings (January 8, 2023). Elnahas, A., Md Noman H, and Siamak J., CEO marital status and corporate cash holdings, European Financial Management, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4085811 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4085811

Ahmed Elnahas (Contact Author)

The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley ( email )

1201 W. University Dr.
College of Business and Entrep
Edinburg, TX 78539
United States

Md Noman Hossain

Central Washington University - College of Business ( email )

Ellensburg, WA 98926
United States

Siamak Javadi

University of Texas - Rio Grande Valley ( email )

1201 W. University Dr.
Edinburg, TX 78539
United States

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