How Does Party Discipline Affect Legislative Behavior? Evidence from Within-Session Variation in Lame Duck Status

52 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2022

See all articles by Jon H. Fiva

Jon H. Fiva

Norwegian School of Management (BI) - Department of Economics

Oda Nedregård

BI Norwegian Business School

Date Written: 2022

Abstract

How important are political parties in motivating and disciplining elected officials? Using a difference-in-discontinuity design, we study how shocks to incumbents’ re-election probabilities affect legislative behavior in a setting where parties fully control candidate selection. We find that within-session variation in lame-duck status has a strong negative effect on the probability of showing up in parliament to vote. We find, however, no clear evidence that lame-duck status affects the extent to which legislators deviate from the party line. Our findings align well with the citizen-candidate framework, where candidates have fixed ideological positions that do not vary based on electoral incentives.

Keywords: political parties, party discipline, roll-call votes, legislative speech, difference-in-discontinuity design

JEL Classification: D720

Suggested Citation

Fiva, Jon H. and Nedregård, Oda, How Does Party Discipline Affect Legislative Behavior? Evidence from Within-Session Variation in Lame Duck Status (2022). CESifo Working Paper No. 9697, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4087952 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4087952

Jon H. Fiva (Contact Author)

Norwegian School of Management (BI) - Department of Economics ( email )

Oslo
Norway

Oda Nedregård

BI Norwegian Business School ( email )

Nydalsveien 37
Oslo, 0442
Norway

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