Efficiencies in Merger Review: Global Antitrust Institute Comment on the DOJ-FTC Request for Information on Merger Enforcement

16 Pages Posted: 22 Apr 2022

See all articles by Alexander Raskovich

Alexander Raskovich

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Bruce H. Kobayashi

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School

Abbott B. Lipsky

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School

Joshua D. Wright

Lodestar Law and Economics

John M. Yun

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School

Date Written: April 21, 2022

Abstract

The Global Antitrust Institute (“GAI”) respectfully submits this Comment to the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) in connection with their Request for Information on Merger Enforcement (“Merger RFI”). The GAI welcomes the opportunity to provide input on the proposed changes to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“HMGs”) based upon its extensive experience and expertise in antitrust law and economics. This particular GAI Comment focuses on Section 14 of the Merger RFI, in which the Agencies pose two questions that go to the heart of the treatment of efficiencies in merger review. First, the Agencies suggest (Merger RFI 14.a) that efficiencies may have no proper role whatsoever in merger review. Second, in case consideration of efficiencies is appropriate, the Agencies ask (Merger RFI 14.c) what degree of certainty should be applied to efficiencies evidence to establish cognizability, and in particular to establish merger-specificity. This Comment explains how efficiencies are integral to an accurate assessment of the competitive effects of a horizontal merger, and that efficiencies evidence should in principle be accorded equal consideration to other factors.

Keywords: antitrust, competition policy, horizontal mergers, vertical mergers, Merger Guidelines, Federal Trade Commission, Department of Justice, Clayton Act, Sherman Act, FTC Act, market power, efficiencies, competitive process, competitive externalities, compensating marginal cost reduction, Herfindahl-Hir

JEL Classification: D6, D61, D62, K2, K21, L1, L2, L22, L4, L40, L41

Suggested Citation

Raskovich, Alexander and Kobayashi, Bruce H. and Lipsky, Abbott B. and Wright, Joshua D. and Yun, John M., Efficiencies in Merger Review: Global Antitrust Institute Comment on the DOJ-FTC Request for Information on Merger Enforcement (April 21, 2022). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 22-18, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4089959 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4089959

Alexander Raskovich (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
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Bruce H. Kobayashi

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-8034 (Phone)
703-993-8088 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~bkobayas

Abbott B. Lipsky

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Joshua D. Wright

Lodestar Law and Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 751
Mclean, VA 22101
United States

John M. Yun

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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