Climate Regulatory Risks and Corporate Bonds

69 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2022 Last revised: 8 Jan 2024

See all articles by Lee Seltzer

Lee Seltzer

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Laura T. Starks

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance

Qifei Zhu

National University of Singapore (NUS)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 1, 2022

Abstract

Investor and policymaker concerns about climate risks suggest these risks should affect the risk assessment and pricing of corporate securities, particularly for firms facing stricter regulatory enforcement. Using corporate bonds, the authors find support for this hypothesis. Employing a shock to expected climate regulations, they show climate regulatory risks causally affect bond credit ratings and spreads. A structural credit model indicates that the increased spreads for high carbon issuers, especially those located in stricter regulatory environments, are driven by changes in firms' asset volatilities rather than asset values, highlighting that regulatory uncertainty affects security pricing. The results have important implications for policy-making.

Keywords: climate risk, regulatory risk, fixed income

JEL Classification: G38, G24, G00

Suggested Citation

Seltzer, Lee and Starks, Laura T. and Zhu, Qifei, Climate Regulatory Risks and Corporate Bonds (April 1, 2022). FRB of New York Staff Report No. 1014, Rev. January 2024, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4090897 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4090897

Lee Seltzer (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

Laura T. Starks

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance ( email )

Red McCombs School of Business
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-5899 (Phone)
512-471-5073 (Fax)

Qifei Zhu

National University of Singapore (NUS) ( email )

1E Kent Ridge Road
NUHS Tower Block Level 7
Singapore, 119228
Singapore

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