Agency Problems in Young Firms

43 Pages Posted: 17 May 2022

See all articles by Deniz Okat

Deniz Okat

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST)

Mikael Paaso

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)

Date Written: April 25, 2022

Abstract

We document the existence of manager-shareholder agency problems caused by excess cash in young firms. Firms receiving quasi-random cash windfalls from the exercise of the overallotment option during their IPO are more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions. We hand-collect executive compensation data for these firms and find that the CEOs of these firms receive direct pecuniary benefits in the form of higher executive compensation. We run several tests to account for the potential endogeneity of the overallotment option with respect to investment. While previous work on the free cash flow hypothesis has focused on mature firms, we show that these problems also exist in young firms.

Keywords: Free cash flow hypothesis, cash holdings, overallotment option, IPO

JEL Classification: D22, G02, G10, G31

Suggested Citation

Okat, Deniz and Paaso, Mikael, Agency Problems in Young Firms (April 25, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4092719 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4092719

Deniz Okat (Contact Author)

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) ( email )

Clearwater Bay
Kowloon, 999999
Hong Kong

Mikael Paaso

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) ( email )

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
3000 DR Rotterdam, Zuid-Holland 3062PA
Netherlands

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