The Agency Costs of (RMBS) Tranching

49 Pages Posted: 2 May 2022 Last revised: 19 Jul 2022

See all articles by Sanket Korgaonkar

Sanket Korgaonkar

University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce

Date Written: June 2022

Abstract

The tranching of cash flows from an asset pool into multiple securities with varying priorities worsens agency frictions between investors and the asset manager. This paper shows that agents managing subprime residential mortgages on behalf of mortgage backed security investors were less likely to renegotiate delinquent loans from pools which collateralized both a higher number of tranches, and tranches with more varied seniorities. Agents particularly pull back from renegotiating loans that require more of their costly effort. We rule out key alternative explanations such as loan pool credit quality, and agent skill and capacity. Overall, our results highlight the potential costs of multi-tiered capital structures.

Keywords: Capital Structure, Securitization, Mortgages, Asymmetric Information

JEL Classification: G21, G23, G32, D82

Suggested Citation

Korgaonkar, Sanket, The Agency Costs of (RMBS) Tranching (June 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4093371 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4093371

Sanket Korgaonkar (Contact Author)

University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce ( email )

P.O. Box 400173
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4173
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
25
Abstract Views
109
PlumX Metrics