Targeted Sanctions Against Authoritarian Elites

44 Pages Posted: 3 May 2022

See all articles by Julia Grauvogel

Julia Grauvogel

German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)

Nikolay Marinov

University of Houston - Department of Political Science

Tsz-Ning Wong

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 26, 2022

Abstract

A significant part of economic coercion deployed by the US, EU and the UN targets authoritarian regimes' ruling elites, and aims to promote liberalization by encouraging defections and discouraging repression. We develop a model to study the effects of such measures. The ruler chooses how much power to delegate to elites, while bracing for a challenge that can come from elites or from the masses. The elite decides whether to fight for the ruler, walk away, or stage a coup. If elites get more power, they can serve the ruler better - or they can stage a coup, a decision that depends on their loyalty. Depending on how much the ruler trusts the elite, targeted sanctions may lead to more power being delegated, thus inducing coups and repression, or it may lead to less power being delegated, which results in moderation and liberalization. In addition to the static effects, the model identifies the unintended dynamic effect of sanctions. Because targeted measures are individually costly, they act as a screening mechanism for the ruler and reveal the true loyalty of elites. This helps stabilize weak regimes. We illustrate the predictions of the model leveraging within within-case and cross-case empirical evidence.

Keywords: Authoritarian Elites, Targeted Sanctions

JEL Classification: F51

Suggested Citation

Grauvogel, Julia and Marinov, Nikolay and Wong, Tsz-Ning, Targeted Sanctions Against Authoritarian Elites (April 26, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4094157 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4094157

Julia Grauvogel

German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) ( email )

Neuer Jungfernstieg 21
Hamburg, DE D-20354
Germany

Nikolay Marinov

University of Houston - Department of Political Science ( email )

TX 77204-3011
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.nikolaymarinov.com

Tsz-Ning Wong (Contact Author)

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/tszningwongecon/

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