Impact of Risk Oversight Functions on Bank Risk:  Evidence from the Dodd-Frank Act

54 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2022

See all articles by Lakshmi Balasubramanyan

Lakshmi Balasubramanyan

Case Western Reserve University - Weatherhead School of Management

Naveen D. Daniel

Drexel University - Department of Finance

Joseph Haubrich

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Lalitha Naveen

Temple University - Department of Finance

Abstract

We document the impact of having a risk committee (RC) and a chief risk officer (CRO) on bank risk using the passage of the Dodd Frank Act as a natural experiment.  The Act requires bank holding companies with over $10B of assets to have an RC to oversee risk management, while those with over $50B of assets are additionally required to have a CRO.  We use difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity approaches to estimate the change in risk following RC and CRO adoption. Overall, we find no evidence that the RC or CRO have a causal impact on bank risk.

Keywords: Bank Holding Companies, Risk, Chief Risk Officer, Risk Committee, Dodd Frank Act, Bank Risk, Corporate Governance

Suggested Citation

Balasubramanyan, Lakshmi and Daniel, Naveen D. and Haubrich, Joseph and Naveen, Lalitha, Impact of Risk Oversight Functions on Bank Risk:  Evidence from the Dodd-Frank Act. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4094786 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4094786

Lakshmi Balasubramanyan

Case Western Reserve University - Weatherhead School of Management ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106-7235
United States

Naveen D. Daniel

Drexel University - Department of Finance ( email )

LeBow College of Business
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-895-5858 (Phone)
215-895-2955 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://lebow.drexel.edu/Faculty/DanielN

Joseph Haubrich

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland ( email )

East 6th & Superior
Cleveland, OH 44101-1387
United States

Lalitha Naveen (Contact Author)

Temple University - Department of Finance ( email )

Fox School of Business and Management
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
215-204-6435 (Phone)

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