Peer Financial Reports and Corporate Cash Policy

39 Pages Posted: 5 May 2022 Last revised: 26 Apr 2023

See all articles by Marcelo Ortiz M.

Marcelo Ortiz M.

Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Barcelona School of Management; Barcelona School of Economics

Francisco Urzúa I.

City University London - Bayes Business School

Date Written: June 13, 2024

Abstract

This study examined the effects of peer financial reports on corporate cash policies. We focus on private European firms below the legal firm-size thresholds for extended reporting requirements and evaluate how the proportion of industry peers with extended reporting mandates influences their cash policies. We document a positive impact of peer reports on cash holdings, in line with an increase in the internal financing capacity to fund investment opportunities disclosed in peer reports. This positive effect is consistently stronger in industries with more growth opportunities, particularly for smaller and more profitable firms. Conversely, peer reports are correlated with lower cash holdings in industries with more volatile cash flows and greater reliance on long-term trade credit. Further analyses reveal limited effects on external financing frictions and agency-driven cash holdings. Overall, the evidence suggests that heterogeneous effects are driven by variations in financing needs and cash flow uncertainty.

Keywords: Information Spillover, Cash Holding, Private Firms, Reporting Regulation M41, M48, G32

JEL Classification: M41, M48, G32.

Suggested Citation

Ortiz M., Marcelo and Urzua, Francisco, Peer Financial Reports and Corporate Cash Policy (June 13, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4096239 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4096239

Marcelo Ortiz M. (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Barcelona
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://www.marceloortizm.com

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Barcelona School of Management ( email )

Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Barcelona School of Economics ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Francisco Urzua

City University London - Bayes Business School ( email )

United Kingdom

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