Do Paid Sick Leave Mandates Increase Productivity?

69 Pages Posted: 17 May 2022 Last revised: 30 Apr 2024

See all articles by Liangrong Chunyu

Liangrong Chunyu

University of Essex

Paolo F. Volpin

Drexel University - Bennett S. LeBow College of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); City University London - Faculty of Finance

Xingchen Zhu

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: April 30, 2024

Abstract

This paper exploits the staggered implementation of paid sick leave (PSL) mandates to assess their real effects on U.S. corporations. We find that mandatory access to sick pay leads to higher labor productivity and firm profitability. These performance improvements concentrate in industries that require more physical presence in the workplace, which suggests that PSL generates a positive health externality. The effects are also more pronounced for firms with more expensive labor force, indicating that employees who value sick pay benefits have high human capital, and in counties with higher social capital, where the risk of absenteeism may be less severe.

Keywords: Paid Sick Leave, Firm Performance, Employee Health, Human Capital

JEL Classification: G3, I18, J32, M5

Suggested Citation

Chunyu, Liangrong and Volpin, Paolo F. and Zhu, Xingchen, Do Paid Sick Leave Mandates Increase Productivity? (April 30, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4096707 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4096707

Liangrong Chunyu

University of Essex ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

Paolo F. Volpin (Contact Author)

Drexel University - Bennett S. LeBow College of Business ( email )

101 N. 33rd St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

City University London - Faculty of Finance ( email )

London, EC2Y 8HB
Great Britain

Xingchen Zhu

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
Amsterdam, 1081HV
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

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