Strengthening Police Oversight: the Impacts of Misconduct Investigators on Police Officer Behavior

46 Pages Posted: 6 May 2022 Last revised: 20 Sep 2023

See all articles by Andrew Jordan

Andrew Jordan

Washington University in St. Louis

Taeho Kim

University of Toronto

Date Written: December 30, 2022

Abstract

We study how civilian complaint investigators affect officer behavior in Chicago. We exploit quasi-random assignment of complaints to supervising investigators and use variation in whether supervisors tend to acquire sworn affidavits that substantiate the complaints. When the assigned investigator opens more investigations through obtaining affidavits, accused officers accumulate fewer complaints in the first three months of the investigation. We find that, prior to a scandal, assignment to high-investigation supervisors causes officers to make more arrests. However, this reverses after the scandal. Our findings suggest that police watchdogs can improve officer behavior in ordinary oversight environments but may backfire in heightened oversight environments.

Keywords: Police, Misconduct, Instrumental variables

JEL Classification: C26, K42, M50

Suggested Citation

Jordan, Andrew and Kim, Taeho, Strengthening Police Oversight: the Impacts of Misconduct Investigators on Police Officer Behavior (December 30, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4099052 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4099052

Andrew Jordan (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1208
Saint Louis, MO MO 63130-4899
United States

Taeho Kim

University of Toronto ( email )

105 St George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G8
Canada

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