Inequitable by Design: The Law and Politics of Global COVID-19 Vaccine Access — And a Way Out

92 Pages Posted: 16 May 2022 Last revised: 4 Jul 2023

See all articles by Ximena Benavides

Ximena Benavides

Yale University, Department of Political Science, Students; Yale University - Yale Information Society Project; Yale Law School

Date Written: May 8, 2022

Abstract

U.S.-produced COVID-19 mRNA vaccines have been inequitably distributed globally. The development and production of new vaccines often result in preferential access for countries and populations that can afford them, rather than those in greater need. This distribution based on wealth instead of public health concerns is influenced by a patent culture in which intellectual property (IP) and complementary incentives shape drug development. The article argues that such a patent culture and the resulting drug development model stand in contradiction with the idea that IP rights promote innovation since these policy choices favor the consolidation of monopolistic power in the hands of a few private actors who control vaccine production and supply. The patent culture fundamentally neglects health equity as a foundational governing principle and commodifies access to healthcare. More equitable drug development efforts would rely on three guiding principles: public value, transparency and accountability, and inclusivity.

Note:
Funding Information: Yale Institute for Global Health and Yale University’s Fox International Fellowship at the MacMillan Center grants that supported this research project

Conflict of Interests: None to declare.

Keywords: Health Law, Health Policy, Health Equity, COVID-19 Vaccine, Intellectual Property, Patents, Patent Culture, Political Economy, Health Justice, Access to Medicine, Pharmaceutical companies

Suggested Citation

Benavides, Ximena, Inequitable by Design: The Law and Politics of Global COVID-19 Vaccine Access — And a Way Out (May 8, 2022). University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2023., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4104649 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4104649

Ximena Benavides (Contact Author)

Yale University, Department of Political Science, Students ( email )

New Haven, CT 06520
United States

Yale University - Yale Information Society Project ( email )

127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06511
United States

Yale Law School ( email )

127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06510
United States

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