The Gender Disclosure Gap: Salary History Bans Unravel When Men Volunteer their Income

71 Pages Posted: 11 May 2022 Last revised: 7 Mar 2024

See all articles by Bo Cowgill

Bo Cowgill

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Amanda Y. Agan

Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Laura Gee

Tufts University; IZA

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 9, 2022

Abstract

This study investigates whether the success of salary history bans could be limited by job-seekers volunteering their salaries unprompted. We survey American workers in 2019 and 2021 about their recent job searches, distinguishing when candidates were asked about salary history from when they were not. Historically well-paid workers may have an incentive to disclose, and employers who are aware of this could infer that non-disclosing workers are concealing low salaries. Through this mechanism, all workers could face pressure to avoid the stigma of silence. Our data shows a large percentage of workers (28%) volunteer salary history, even when a ban prevents employers from asking. An additional 47% will disclose if enough other job candidates disclose. Men are more likely than women to disclose their salaries unprompted, especially if they believe other candidates are disclosing. Over our 1.5-year sample covering jurisdictions with (and without) bans, unprompted volunteering of salary histories increased by about 6-8 percentage points. 

Keywords: Voluntary disclosure, information economics, organizations, hiring, compensation, inequality, salary history bans, statistical discrimination

Suggested Citation

Cowgill, Bo and Agan, Amanda Y. and Gee, Laura, The Gender Disclosure Gap: Salary History Bans Unravel When Men Volunteer their Income (May 9, 2022). Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 4104743, Organization Science, 0 [10.1287/orsc.2023.17384], Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4104743 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2023.17384

Bo Cowgill (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Amanda Y. Agan

Rutgers University, Department of Economics ( email )

New Jersey Hall
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08901, NJ Princeton 08540
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/amandayagan/

Laura Gee

Tufts University ( email )

Medford, MA 02155
United States

IZA

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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