The Gender Disclosure Gap: Salary History Bans Unravel When Men Volunteer their Income

60 Pages Posted: 11 May 2022 Last revised: 18 Sep 2023

See all articles by Bo Cowgill

Bo Cowgill

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Amanda Y. Agan

Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Laura Gee

Tufts University; IZA

Date Written: May 9, 2022

Abstract

New laws aim to reduce historical inequalities by limiting the information employers can seek. Although employers are forbidden from seeking certain information, workers are free to disclose voluntarily. We study these bans through the lens of disclosure theory. A large survey of the US workforce shows that men are more likely to disclose their salaries unprompted, particularly when they believe that other candidates are volunteering. Women report higher psychological costs of disclosing, and are more likely to resist unraveling. A simple theoretical model shows the importance of the psychological costs of disclosing, and of the coarseness of employer beliefs about group differences. Our survey finds evidence of these mechanisms, as well as disclosure patterns consistent with unraveling in the U.S. job market. A large percentage of workers (28\%) volunteer salary history, even when a ban prevents employers from asking. An additional 47% will disclose if enough rival job candidates disclose. Between November 2019 and May 2021, unprompted volunteering of salaries increased by about 6-8 percentage points. Consistent with disclosure theory, workers act as if silence is a negative signal.

Suggested Citation

Cowgill, Bo and Agan, Amanda Y. and Gee, Laura, The Gender Disclosure Gap: Salary History Bans Unravel When Men Volunteer their Income (May 9, 2022). Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 4104743, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4104743 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4104743

Bo Cowgill (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Amanda Y. Agan

Rutgers University, Department of Economics ( email )

New Jersey Hall
75 Hamilton St
08901, NJ Princeton 08540
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/amandayagan/

Laura Gee

Tufts University ( email )

Medford, MA 02155
United States

IZA

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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