The Manchin Paradox

Forthcoming, 2023, Quarterly Journal of Political Science

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper

18 Pages Posted: 23 May 2022

See all articles by Keith Krehbiel

Keith Krehbiel

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Sara Krehbiel

Santa Clara University

Date Written: March 25, 2022

Abstract

We identify and analyze an enigma of U.S. Senate procedure. Why does its pivotal voter
under simple-majority voting prefer that the body makes law using super-majority cloture (e.g., the filibuster, or threat thereof, within the strictures of Rule XXII)? Using a two-stage game of procedural choice and policy choice, we reveal and rationalize the Manchin Paradox and explore its implications for super-majoritarianism and legislative organization.

Keywords: Filibuster, median voter theory, monopoly agenda-setting, pivotal politics, procedural choice, super-majoritarianism, legislative organization, Senate reform

Suggested Citation

Krehbiel, Keith and Krehbiel, Sara, The Manchin Paradox (March 25, 2022). Forthcoming, 2023, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4104766 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4104766

Keith Krehbiel (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

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