State Ownership and Corporate Leverage Around the World

53 Pages Posted: 11 May 2022

See all articles by Ralph De Haas

Ralph De Haas

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); KU Leuven

Sergei Guriev

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Alexander Stepanov

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 10, 2022

Abstract

Does state ownership hinder or help firms access credit? We use data on almost 4 million firms in 89 countries to study the relationship between state ownership and corporate leverage. Controlling for country-sector-year fixed effects and conventional firm-level determinants of leverage, we show that state ownership is robustly and negatively related to corporate leverage. This relationship holds across most of the firm-size distribution, with the important exception of the largest companies, and is stronger in countries with weak political and legal institutions. A panel data analysis of privatized firms and a comparison of privatized with matched control firms yield similar qualitative and quantitative effects of state ownership on leverage.

Keywords: State ownership, privatization, corporate debt, state banks

JEL Classification: D22, F36, G32, G38, H11, H81, L33

Suggested Citation

De Haas, Ralph and Guriev, Sergei and Stepanov, Alexander, State Ownership and Corporate Leverage Around the World (May 10, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4105153 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4105153

Ralph De Haas (Contact Author)

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( email )

One Exchange Square
London, EC2A 2JN
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: www.ebrd.com

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

KU Leuven

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Sergei Guriev

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) ( email )

27 rue Saint-Guillaume
Paris Cedex 07, 75337
France

HOME PAGE: http://econ.sciences-po.fr/staff/sergei-guriev

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Alexander Stepanov

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) ( email )

One Exchange Square
London, EC2A 2EH
United Kingdom

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