Sophisticated Learning and Learning Sophistication

14 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2003

See all articles by Dale O. Stahl

Dale O. Stahl

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 2003

Abstract

We test the population rule learning model for symmetric normal-form games, and strongly reject: (i) no rule learning, (ii) no diversity, and (iii) no sophisticated evidence. Further, trembles and herd behavior decline and level-2 behavior increases over time.

Keywords: rule learning, normal-form games, sophisticated learninf

JEL Classification: C15, C52, C72

Suggested Citation

Stahl, Dale O., Sophisticated Learning and Learning Sophistication (March 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=410921 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.410921

Dale O. Stahl (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-475-8541 (Phone)
512-471-3510 (Fax)

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