Exit from Rent-Seeking Contests

11 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2003

See all articles by Jun-ichi Itaya

Jun-ichi Itaya

Hokkaido University - Division of Modern Economics and Management

Hiroyuki Sano

Otaru University of Commerce

Abstract

The object of this paper is to investigate the long-run behaviour of rent-seekers in a situation where they incur negative expected payoffs due to increasing returns to rent-seeking expenditures. To this end, we embed the one-shot rent-seeking game presented by Tullock (1980) in the war-of-attrition framework. In this multi-period setting, each player not only determines his or her rent-seeking expenditure but also chooses a mixed strategy on whether to stay in or exit from rent-seeking competition in each period.

JEL Classification: D72, C72, L12

Suggested Citation

Itaya, Jun-ichi and Sano, Hiroyuki, Exit from Rent-Seeking Contests. Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 54, pp. 218-228, June 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=411130

Jun-ichi Itaya (Contact Author)

Hokkaido University - Division of Modern Economics and Management ( email )

Sapporo 060-0809
Japan

Hiroyuki Sano

Otaru University of Commerce

3-5-21 Midori
Otaru-shi, Hokkaido 047-8501
Japan

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