Matching with Strategic Consistency

43 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2017 Last revised: 12 Dec 2023

See all articles by Marzena J. Rostek

Marzena J. Rostek

University of Wisconsin - Madison

Nathan Yoder

University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 11, 2023

Abstract

In many environments, agents form agreements that have externalities or are multilateral, and may view some agreements as substitutable and others as complementary. This paper presents an approach that accommodates arbitrary externalities, preferences, and market structures in matching models. It does so by endogenizing the agents’ choice functions while employing the standard stability concept. Instead of assuming that each agent chooses their favorite set of contracts, we require agents to choose optimally given correct beliefs about the choices of others. We show how our results facilitate new comparative statics about stable outcomes and allow the use of matching-theoretic stability in new applications.

Keywords: Externalities, multilateral matching, matching with contracts, stability

JEL Classification: C78, D47, D85

Suggested Citation

Rostek, Marzena J. and Yoder, Nathan, Matching with Strategic Consistency (December 11, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2997223 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2997223

Marzena J. Rostek

University of Wisconsin - Madison ( email )

1180 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53703
United States
(608) 262-6723 (Phone)
(608) 262-2033 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mrostek

Nathan Yoder (Contact Author)

University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/nathanyoderecon/

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
770
Abstract Views
3,202
Rank
60,221
PlumX Metrics