A Model of Repeated Collective Decisions

40 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2022

See all articles by Antonin Macé

Antonin Macé

Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS

Rafael Treibich

University of Southern Denmark - Department of Economics

Date Written: March 29, 2022

Abstract

The theory of repeated games offers a compelling rationale for cooperation in a variety of environments. Yet, its consequences for collective decision-making have been largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose a general model of repeated voting in committees and study equilibrium behavior under alternative majority rules. Our main characterization reveals a complex, non-monotonic, relationship between the majority threshold, the preference distribution, and the optimal equilibrium outcome. In contrast with the stage-game equilibrium, the optimal equilibrium of the repeated game involves a form of implicit logroll, individuals sometimes voting against their preference to achieve the efficient decision. In turn, this affects the optimal voting rule, which may significantly differ from the optimal rule under sincere voting. The model provides a rationale for the use of unanimity rule, while accounting for the prevalence of consensus in committees which use a lower majority threshold.

Keywords: Voting, Repeated Games, Logrolling, Unanimity, Consensus

JEL Classification: D7, C73

Suggested Citation

Macé, Antonin and Treibich, Rafael, A Model of Repeated Collective Decisions (March 29, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4114079 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4114079

Antonin Macé

Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS ( email )

France

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/antoninmace/home

Rafael Treibich (Contact Author)

University of Southern Denmark - Department of Economics ( email )

Odense
Denmark

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