Coevolution of Job Automation Risk and Workplace Governance

60 Pages Posted: 19 May 2022 Last revised: 10 Feb 2023

See all articles by Filippo Belloc

Filippo Belloc

University of Siena

Gabriel Burdin

University of Leeds - Faculty of Business; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Luca Cattani

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

William Ellis

Independent Researcher

Fabio Landini

University of Parma

Abstract

This paper analyzes the interplay between the allocation of authority within firms and workers' exposure to automation risk. We propose an evolutionary model to study the complementary fit of job design and workplace governance as resulting from the adoption of worker voice institutions, in particular employee representation (ER). Two organisational conventions are likely to emerge in our framework: in one, workplace governance is based on ER and job designs have low automation risk; in the other, ER is absent and workers are involved in automation-prone production tasks. Using data from a large sample of European workers, we document that automation risk is negatively associated with the presence of ER, consistently with our theoretical framework. Our analysis helps to rationalize the historical experience of Nordic countries, where simultaneous experimentation with codetermination rights and job enrichment programs has taken place. Policy debates about the consequences of automation on labour organization should avoid technological determinism and devote more attention to socio-institutional factors shaping the future of work.

Keywords: automation risk, job design, employee representation, evolutionary game

JEL Classification: O33, J51, C73

Suggested Citation

Belloc, Filippo and Burdin, Gabriel and Cattani, Luca and Ellis, William and Landini, Fabio, Coevolution of Job Automation Risk and Workplace Governance. IZA Discussion Paper No. 14788, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4114326 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4114326

Filippo Belloc (Contact Author)

University of Siena ( email )

Via Banchi di Sotto, 55
Siena, 53100
Italy

Gabriel Burdin

University of Leeds - Faculty of Business ( email )

Leeds LS2 9JT
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Luca Cattani

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

William Ellis

Independent Researcher ( email )

Fabio Landini

University of Parma ( email )

Parma
Italy

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
33
Abstract Views
224
PlumX Metrics