Information, Intermediaries, and International Migration

91 Pages Posted: 19 May 2022

See all articles by Samuel Bazzi

Samuel Bazzi

Boston University - Department of Economics; University of California, San Diego (UCSD)

Lisa A. Cameron

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; J-PAL

Simone Schaner

University of Southern California - Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR)

Firman Witoelar

Australian National University (ANU)

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Abstract

Job seekers often face substantial information frictions related to potential job quality. This is especially true in international labor markets, where intermediaries match prospective migrants with employers abroad. We conducted a randomized trial in Indonesia to explore how information about intermediary quality shapes migration choices and outcomes. Information reduces the migration rate, lowering use of low-quality intermediaries. However, workers who migrate receive better pre-departure preparation and have higher-quality job experiences abroad, despite no change in occupation or destination. Information does not change intentions to migrate or beliefs about the return to migration or intermediary quality. Nor does selection explain the improved outcomes for workers who choose to migrate with the information. Together, our findings are consistent with an increase in the option value of search: with better ability to differentiate offer quality, workers become choosier and ultimately have better migration experiences. This offers a new perspective on the importance of information and matching frictions in global labor markets.

Keywords: international migration, information, middlemen, quality disclosure, search

JEL Classification: F22, O15, D83, L15

Suggested Citation

Bazzi, Samuel and Cameron, Lisa A. and Schaner, Simone and Witoelar, Firman, Information, Intermediaries, and International Migration. IZA Discussion Paper No. 14945, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4114451 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4114451

Samuel Bazzi (Contact Author)

Boston University - Department of Economics

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Lisa A. Cameron

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research ( email )

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Simone Schaner

University of Southern California - Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR) ( email )

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Firman Witoelar

Australian National University (ANU) ( email )

Crawford School of Public Policy
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Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia
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