Autonomous Recitification Behavior of Coal Mine Safety Hazard:Perspective of Evolutionary Game

Abstract

Safety supervision is an important way to urge coal mining enterprises to implement their main responsibilities and reduce coal mine safety accidents. However, different interests have a gambling mind in the face of safety supervision for their own benefit, which leads to safety accidents. Moreover, the literature on the analysis of coal mine safety supervision through game methods lacks research on evolutionary game analysis considering the gambling mind. Therefore, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model considering gambling mind behavior of stakeholders in China’s coal mining safety inspection system. In addition, this paper also explores the numerical simulation of the evolutionary game model to analyze the stability of stakeholder interactions and propose improvements to China's coal mine safety regulatory mechanism by combining the analytical results. The simulation results show that improving the risk identification ability of coal mining enterprises is the key factor for urging coal mining enterprises to rectify safety hazards on their own and avoid accidents; increasing the joint and several responsibilities of governmental supervisory departments has a weak effect on improving the efficiency of supervision and will only make governmental supervisory departments' selection strategy converge to "strong supervision" in the short term, but eventually smooth to "weak supervision", and has less effect on coal mining enterprises' selection strategy; within the scope of discretionary power, increasing the strength of a single penalty is better than increasing the frequency of supervision to urge coal mining enterprises to rectify safety hazards on their own.

Keywords: mine safety hazards；gambling mind；regulatory mechanisms；Self-rectification；evolutionary games