Competing Views on the Economic Structure of Corporate Law

Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 1079
Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance Working Paper 2022-6
European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper No. 651/2022

21 Pages Posted: 24 May 2022 Last revised: 1 Feb 2023

See all articles by Lucian A. Bebchuk

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: May 20, 2022

Abstract

Written for a symposium issue celebrating the thirty-year anniversary of the publication of The Economic Structure of Corporate Law by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel (“E&F”), this essay discusses the interaction of my research over the years with their writings. During the period in which the book and articles were written, and in the many years since then, I have paid close attention to E&F’s writings in my research in the economics of corporate governance. Indeed, a significant part of my research in this field engaged closely with E&F’s writing and reached conclusions that substantially differed from theirs. Below I discuss this engagement of my work with E&F’s writings, and our respective approaches, in five corporate research areas: (i) takeover policy and rules; (ii) contractual freedom in corporate law; (iii) state competition in the provision of corporate law rules; (iv) efficiency and distribution in corporate law; and (v) corporate purpose.

JEL Classification: D02, G30, G38, G39, K22

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A., Competing Views on the Economic Structure of Corporate Law (May 20, 2022). Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 1079
Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance Working Paper 2022-6
European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper No. 651/2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4115819 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4115819

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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