Debt Ownership Structure and Legal System: An International Analysis

Applied Economics, Vol. 37, pp. 355-365

19 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2003 Last revised: 29 Nov 2010

See all articles by Félix J. López-Iturriaga

Félix J. López-Iturriaga

University of Valladolid - Department of Financial Economics and Accounting; National Research University Higher School of Economics - International Laboratory of Intangible-driven Economy

Date Written: May 1, 2003

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the ownership structure of corporate debt from an institutional perspective. We try to identify the factors affecting bank debt use from an international sample of companies from Austria, Germany, Japan, Belgium, France, Italy, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the USA. Our results show that bank debt depends both on factors specific to each company and on institutional features of each country. More exactly, we find that bank loans are related to firm size, to the quality and risk of the projects, and to the collateral. We also find a number of legal-institutional factors impacting on the source of firms' debt, such as creditor protection, firm disclosure requirements and law enforcement.

Keywords: banks, panel data, capital structure, ownership structure, financial system

JEL Classification: G21, G32

Suggested Citation

Lopez-Iturriaga, Felix Javier, Debt Ownership Structure and Legal System: An International Analysis (May 1, 2003). Applied Economics, Vol. 37, pp. 355-365. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=411701 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.411701

Felix Javier Lopez-Iturriaga (Contact Author)

University of Valladolid - Department of Financial Economics and Accounting ( email )

Avda. Valle Esgueva 6
47011 Valladolid
Spain
+34 983 184 395 (Phone)
+34 983 183830 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www2.eco.uva.es/flopez

National Research University Higher School of Economics - International Laboratory of Intangible-driven Economy ( email )

Lebedeva,27
Perm, Perm 614070
Russia

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