Neighborhood CEOs

45 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2022

See all articles by Mario Daniele Amore

Mario Daniele Amore

HEC Paris - Strategy & Business Policy; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Morten Bennedsen

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Birthe Larsen

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 23, 2022

Abstract

The working environment is a key driver of firms’ success. Using unique survey and register data from Denmark, we show that firms led by neighborhood CEOs – defined by physical distance and personal values - exhibit better workplace conditions as perceived both by a regulatory authority and firms’ own employees. The effect is stronger when the CEO’s and employees’ children attend the same school, pointing to social interactions as a channel for the result. Finally, we show that CEOs who emphasize neighborhood engagement adopt a management style tilted toward employees’ welfare.

Suggested Citation

Amore, Mario Daniele and Bennedsen, Morten and Larsen, Birthe, Neighborhood CEOs (May 23, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4117204 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4117204

Mario Daniele Amore (Contact Author)

HEC Paris - Strategy & Business Policy ( email )

Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Morten Bennedsen

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5, Bygn 26
Copenhagen, 1353
Denmark

Birthe Larsen

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Porcelænshaven 16 A
Copenhagen F, DK-2000
Denmark
(+45) 61 79 45 25 (Phone)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
301
Abstract Views
2,504
Rank
186,336
PlumX Metrics