Interest Group Size Dynamics and Policymaking

28 Pages Posted: 31 Jul 2003

See all articles by Vjollca Sadiraj

Vjollca Sadiraj

Georgia State University - Department of Economics

Jan Tuinstra

University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics (KE); Tinbergen Institute

F. A. A. M. Van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: May 2003

Abstract

We present a dynamic model of endogenous interest group sizes and policymaking. The model integrates 'top-down' (policy) and 'bottom-up' (individual and social-structural) influences on the development of interest groups. Comparative statics results show that the standard assumption of fixed-sized interest groups can be very misleading. Furthermore, dynamic analysis of the model demonstrates that reliance on equilibrium results can be misleading as well since equilibria may not be stable. In fact, complicated dynamics may emerge naturally, leading to erratic and path dependent time patterns for policy and interest group sizes. We show that our model can endogenously generate the types of spurts and declines in organizational density that are reported in empirical studies.

Keywords: Interest groups, aspiration level, endogenous fluctuations

JEL Classification: D23, D72, E32, H30

Suggested Citation

Sadiraj, Vjollca and Tuinstra, Jan and Van Winden, F. A. A. M., Interest Group Size Dynamics and Policymaking (May 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=411900 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.411900

Vjollca Sadiraj

Georgia State University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 3992
Atlanta, GA 30302-3992
United States

Jan Tuinstra (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Department of Quantitative Economics (KE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

F. A. A. M. Van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

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