The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents

Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1804

59 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2003

See all articles by Jeremy Bulow

Jeremy Bulow

Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: May 2003

Abstract

Paragraph IV of the Hatch-Waxman Act provides a mechanism for the litigation of pharmaceutical patent infringement disputes. Many of these cases have been settled with "reverse payments" by the brand to the generic in return for delayed generic entry. The FTC has contested a number of these settlements with good but not complete success. This paper argues for per se illegality of settlements that include side payments or deals which are beneficial to the generic. Further, the paper shows a number of additional strategies beyond side payments, some highly questionable from an antitrust perspective, that brands have used to keep out generics.

Suggested Citation

Bulow, Jeremy I., The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents (May 2003). Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1804, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=412123 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.412123

Jeremy I. Bulow (Contact Author)

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