Political Power and Market Power
58 Pages Posted: 27 May 2022
Date Written: April 2022
Abstract
We study the link between political influence and industrial concentration. A model of firm lobbying shows that concentration and regulation may be either strategic complements or substitutes. Using data for the past 20 years in the US, we study whether merging firms' influence activity increases or decreases after a merger. We document an increase in lobbying activity and we find some evidence for an increase in campaign contributions.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Cowgill, Bo and Prat, Andrea and Valletti, Tommaso M., Political Power and Market Power (April 2022). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP17178, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4121353
Bo Cowgill (Contact Author)
Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
Andrea Prat
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
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