An Ugly Face, Really? A Theoretical Investigation into the Causes of Brand Dilution

48 Pages Posted: 27 May 2022

See all articles by Emanuele Bacchiega

Emanuele Bacchiega

University of Bologna - Department of Computer Science and Engineering

Mariachiara Colucci

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Vincenzo Denicolò

Università di Bologna

Marco Magnani

University of Padova; University of Bologna - School of Economics, Management, and Statistics

Date Written: April 2022

Abstract

This paper questions common wisdom about two ideas: first, that brand dilution is the unintended consequence of a poorly executed extension strategy and, second, that brand licensing â?? a widely used means to extend a brand that drives revenues for brand owners - increases the likelihood of brand dilution. Motivated by rich yet fragmented empirical literature, we propose a comprehensive theoretical model of brand extension that encompasses the critical factors which determine the attractiveness and development of brand extension. This allows us to suggest that brand dilution is a viable opportunity to monetize the brand and not necessarily a liability to be avoided. Managers should then consider the brand as an asset on which to invest and, possibly, divest to increase the company's cash inflows. We also confute the causal relationship from licensing to brand dilution. For the products that make the brand owner indifferent between internal and licensed development, switching to licensing always increases the quality of the extension. The model offers a novel perspective on important managerial choices and delivers hypotheses amenable to empirical testing.

Keywords: Brand Dilution, Brand Licensing, Double-sided Moral Hazard, Reciprocal Effect

Suggested Citation

Bacchiega, Emanuele and Colucci, Mariachiara and Denicolò, Vincenzo and Magnani, Marco, An Ugly Face, Really? A Theoretical Investigation into the Causes of Brand Dilution (April 2022). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP17261, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4121444

Emanuele Bacchiega (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Computer Science and Engineering ( email )

Mura Anteo Zamboni 7
Bologna, 40124
Italy

Mariachiara Colucci

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Bologna
Italy

Vincenzo Denicolò

Università di Bologna ( email )

Via Zamboni, 33
Bologna, 40126
Italy

Marco Magnani

University of Padova ( email )

Via del Santo, 33
Padova, 35123
Italy

University of Bologna - School of Economics, Management, and Statistics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy

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