Who Holds Sovereign Debt and Why it Matters

44 Pages Posted: 30 May 2022 Last revised: 18 Mar 2023

See all articles by Xiang Fang

Xiang Fang

The University of Hong Kong

Bryan Hardy

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) - Monetary and Economic Department

Karen K. Lewis

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: May 2022

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of investor composition on the sovereign debt market and the implied funding costs to borrowers. We construct an aggregate data set of sovereign debt holdings by foreign and domestic bank, non-bank private, and official investors for 95 countries over twenty years. We find that private non-bank investors absorb most of the increase in sovereign debt supply. We further find that foreign non-bank investor demand is most responsive to the yield for emerging market (EM) debt, while yield elasticity for all investors is much lower for advanced economy debt. We show that EM sovereigns are highly vulnerable to losing their foreign non-bank investors.

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Suggested Citation

Fang, Xiang and Hardy, Bryan and Lewis, Karen Kay, Who Holds Sovereign Debt and Why it Matters (May 2022). NBER Working Paper No. w30087, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4122816 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4122816

Xiang Fang (Contact Author)

The University of Hong Kong ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong, Pokfulam HK
China

Bryan Hardy

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) - Monetary and Economic Department ( email )

Centralbahnplatz 2
CH-4002 Basel
Switzerland

Karen Kay Lewis

University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department ( email )

The Wharton School
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Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
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215-898-6200 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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