Endogenous Popularity: How Perceptions of Support Affect the Popularity of Authoritarian Regimes

28 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2022

See all articles by Noah Buckley

Noah Buckley

Trinity College (Dublin); National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Kyle L. Marquardt

University of Bergen

Ora John Reuter

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee - Department of Political Science; National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Katerina Tertytchnaya

University College London

Date Written: March 2022

Abstract

Autocracies with popular leaders tend to survive longer. A growing body of scholarship therefore focuses on the factors that influence authoritarian popularity. However, it is possible that the perception of popularity itself breeds popularity in nondemocratic regimes, impacting incumbent approval. Here we use framing experiments embedded in four recent surveys in Russia to examine the extent to which information about the support an authoritarian leader enjoys influences the level of support respondents report for him. We find that negative information about the Russian president's popularity decreases support for him, while positive information has no effect. Additional analyses, which rely on a novel combination of framing and list experiments, provide evidence that these changes are not due to preference falsification. This study has implications for research on the origins of incumbent approval and dramatic defection cascades in nondemocratic regimes.

Suggested Citation

Buckley, Noah and Marquardt, Kyle L. and Reuter, Ora John and Tertytchnaya, Katerina, Endogenous Popularity: How Perceptions of Support Affect the Popularity of Authoritarian Regimes (March 2022). V-Dem Working Paper 2022: 132, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4123330 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4123330

Noah Buckley (Contact Author)

Trinity College (Dublin) ( email )

D2
Ireland

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow) ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Kyle L. Marquardt

University of Bergen ( email )

Muséplassen 1
N-5008 Bergen, +47 55 58
Norway

Ora John Reuter

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee - Department of Political Science ( email )

PO Box 413
Milwaukee, WI 53211
United States

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow) ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Katerina Tertytchnaya

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

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