Improving State Environmental Enforcement Performance Through Enhanced Government Accountability and Other Strategies

Abstract

Most federal environmental statutes currently operate under a framework known as "cooperative federalism," in which states receive primary authority to implement the requirements of federal laws, under EPA supervision. Over the years, states have gradually assumed "primacy" in more and more areas; they now have authority to implement approximately three-quarters of the major federal environmental programs that can be delegated to them, and carry out in the neighborhood of eighty percent of the enforcement actions under the federal statutes.

This increased reliance on state implementation is a "double-edged sword" for the federal EPA, which remains ultimately accountable for administration of the federal environmental laws. This is true in the enforcement arena, among others. The federal concern with state performance in this arena is particularly salient in light of a host of studies that indicate that the performance of many state enforcement programs falls substantially short of EPA's expectations, which traditionally have been based on a deterrence-oriented model of enforcement. This article discusses a number of options for EPA to strengthen state performance and bring it more in line with EPA's expectations, including strategies that will enhance government accountability.