Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority

Harrington, Joseph E.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.412486

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Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority

Johns Hopkins Department of Economics Working Paper No. 487

49 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2003

See all articles by Joseph E. Harrington

Joseph E. Harrington

Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 2003

Abstract

Price-fixing is characterized when firms are concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed. Antitrust laws have a complex effect on pricing as they interact with the conditions determining the internal stability of the cartel. The qualitative properties of pricing dynamics are characterized and the impact of antitrust policy is explored.

JEL Classification: L1, L4

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Harrington, Joseph E., Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority (May 2003). Johns Hopkins Department of Economics Working Paper No. 487, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=412486 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.412486