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Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry

Martin Shubik

Yale University - School of Management; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Eric Smith

Santa Fe Institute - Economics

May 2003

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1419

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: Strategic Market Games, Clearinghouses, Credit Evaluation, Default

JEL Classification: C7, G10, G20, L10, D40, D50

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Date posted: June 4, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Shubik, Martin and Smith, Eric, Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry (May 2003). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1419. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=412493

Contact Information

Martin Shubik (Contact Author)
Yale University - School of Management ( email )
Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )
Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States
203-432-3694 (Phone)
203-432-6167 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/au/d_shubik.htm

David Eric Smith
Santa Fe Institute - Economics ( email )
1399 Hyde Park Rd
Santa Fe, NM 87501
United States
Feedback to SSRN

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