Cheating Responses to Tax Evasion

53 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2022

See all articles by Andrea FM Martinangeli

Andrea FM Martinangeli

Burgundy School of Business; University of Gothenburg - Centre for Collective Action (CeCAR)

Lisa Windsteiger

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Date Written: June 1, 2022

Abstract

We explore cheating behaviours in a die roll task in response to information about tax malpractice in Italy using a survey experiment on a representative sample of the Italian population. We thus generalise laboratory findings on conditional behaviours (cooperation, cheating) to uncover their real-world bearing in the context of tax compliance. Cheating is strongly conditioned on information about tax malpractice, as is the perceived tax compliance norm. We uncover asymmetries along the income gradient: Conditional cheating responses are driven by information about tax malpractice on behalf of top income earners, while perceived tax compliance norms are driven by information about tax malpractice among low income earners.

Keywords: Tax evasion, tax avoidance, conditional cooperation, cheating, survey experiment

JEL Classification: D01, D31, D63, H23, H26

Suggested Citation

Martinangeli, Andrea and Windsteiger, Lisa, Cheating Responses to Tax Evasion (June 1, 2022). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2022-07, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4125079 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4125079

Andrea Martinangeli

Burgundy School of Business ( email )

29 Rue Sambin
Dijon, 21000
France

University of Gothenburg - Centre for Collective Action (CeCAR) ( email )

Box 100, S-405 30
Gothenburg
Sweden

Lisa Windsteiger (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
20
Abstract Views
82
PlumX Metrics