Binding Effect of Public Enforcement Decisions

RODGER, B., SOUSA FERRO, M. & MARCOS, F. (eds.), Research Handbook on Competition Law Private Enforcement in the EU, Edward Elgar, 2022

32 Pages Posted: 10 Jun 2022

See all articles by Miguel Sousa Ferro

Miguel Sousa Ferro

University of Lisbon Law School; University of Lisbon - School of Law

Date Written: June 3, 2022

Abstract

This paper provides an overview of the legal status quo in the European Union relating to the binding effect, in follow-on competition law cases, of public enforcement decisions, as well as of some of the legal issues which are likely to be the subject of controversy in years to come, in this regard. It addresses decisions declaring antitrust infringements adopted by the European Commission and by national competition authorities, as well as commitment decisions and decisions declaring infringements of merger control and State aid rules. It discusses the material, subjective and temporal scope of the binding effect. It also addresses other issues, such as the obligations of national courts relating to non-infringement decisions and on-going investigations, and the issue of negative declarations. Finally, it looks into the arguments which may be put forward by litigants before national courts to avoid or circumvent the binding effect of public enforcement decisions. It is argued that the case-law already provides answers to many of the issues which are likely to be raised, which one may arrive at through a systematic and coherent interpretation of the general principles of EU Law, as clarified by the Court.

Keywords: Antitrust, Competition Law, EU Law, Private Enforcement

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Sousa Ferro, Miguel, Binding Effect of Public Enforcement Decisions (June 3, 2022). RODGER, B., SOUSA FERRO, M. & MARCOS, F. (eds.), Research Handbook on Competition Law Private Enforcement in the EU, Edward Elgar, 2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4126981

Miguel Sousa Ferro (Contact Author)

University of Lisbon Law School ( email )

Alameda da Universidade, Cidade Universitária
Lisboa, 1649-014
Portugal

University of Lisbon - School of Law ( email )

Alameda da Universidade, Cidade Universitária
Lisboa, 1649-014
Portugal

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