Mitigating Cyber Vulnerabilities in Distribution-Level Electricity Markets

41 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2022

See all articles by Jason Dedrick

Jason Dedrick

Syracuse University

Keli A. Perrin

Syracuse University College of Law

Ehsan Sabaghian

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Peter Wilcoxen

Syracuse University

Abstract

Improved management of the distribution level of the electric grid could allow faster and more reliable deployment of renewable energy sources, better support for electric vehicles, and greater resilience. Recent advances in computing and communications technology will enable many of these benefits to be obtained via decentralized, distribution-level markets for electricity. However, we show that such markets could be vulnerable to cyber attacks, and even unsophisticated attacks could create physical or financial risks to the grid and its participants. These risks are exacerbated by an unusual feature of electricity relative to other markets: technical limits and policy constraints mean buyers and sellers cannot be disconnected from the grid quickly, and thus the quantities they demand or supply cannot be restricted to the amounts in their bids in real-time. We present simulation results illustrating a number of these risks and discuss policy options to make the markets more robust and secure.

Keywords: Local Electricity Markets, Prosumers, Denial-of-Service, Cyber-Physical, Simulation, Cybersecurity

Suggested Citation

Dedrick, Jason and Perrin, Keli A. and Sabaghian, Ehsan and Wilcoxen, Peter, Mitigating Cyber Vulnerabilities in Distribution-Level Electricity Markets. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4127858 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4127858

Jason Dedrick (Contact Author)

Syracuse University ( email )

Keli A. Perrin

Syracuse University College of Law ( email )

950 Irving Avenue
Syracuse, NY 13244
United States

Ehsan Sabaghian

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Peter Wilcoxen

Syracuse University ( email )

426 Eggers Hall
Syracuse, NY 13244-2130
United States

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