The Disclosure and Licensing of University Inventions

36 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2003 Last revised: 8 Aug 2021

See all articles by Richard A. Jensen

Richard A. Jensen

University of Notre Dame - Department of Economics

Jerry G. Thursby

Emory University - Department of Economics; Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business

Marie C. Thursby

Georgia Institute of Technology - Strategic Management Area; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: May 2003

Abstract

We examine the interplay of the three major university actors in technology transfer from universities to industry: the faculty, the technology transfer office (TTO), and the central administration. We model the faculty as an agent of the administration, and the TTO as an agent of both the faculty and the administration. Empirical tests of the theory are based on evidence from our survey of 62 US research universities. We find that the TTOs reported licensing objectives are influenced by their views of faculty and administration, which supports the assumption that the TTO is a dual agent. The theory yields predictions for whether or not faculty disclose inventions and if so, at what stage, which in turn affects license contract terms. We also examine how the portion of inventions disclosed at different stages varies with faculty quality. Quality is found to be inversely related to the share of license income allotted to faculty.

Suggested Citation

Jensen, Richard A. and Thursby, Jerry G. and Thursby, Marie C., The Disclosure and Licensing of University Inventions (May 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=412881

Richard A. Jensen

University of Notre Dame - Department of Economics ( email )

Notre Dame, IN 46556
United States

Jerry G. Thursby

Emory University - Department of Economics ( email )

1602 Fishburne Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business ( email )

800 West Peachtree St.
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States

Marie C. Thursby (Contact Author)

Georgia Institute of Technology - Strategic Management Area ( email )

800 West Peachtree St.
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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