Efficiency Effects of 'Privatization' in Argentina's Water and Sanitation Services

21 Pages Posted: 18 Jun 2003

See all articles by Antonio Estache

Antonio Estache

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Lourdes Trujillo

Departamento de Analisis Economico Aplicado; University College of London (UCL)

Date Written: May 2003

Abstract

This paper provides a 'back-of-the-envelope' assessment of the efficiency effects of the reforms of the water sector in Argentina. Private operators are now key players in 15 of Argentina's provinces. While all have adopted incentive based regulatory regimes which require estimates of economic efficiency changes, none have actually issued any estimate yet. This paper provides upper bounds estimates of efficiency gains achieved for 4 operators. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implication of the results for regulatory accounting and data collection processes by regulators in developing countries relying on incentive based regulatory systems.

Keywords: Water privatization, regulation, efficiency gains

JEL Classification: L1, L5, L95

Suggested Citation

Estache, Antonio and Trujillo-Castellano, Lourdes, Efficiency Effects of 'Privatization' in Argentina's Water and Sanitation Services (May 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=412942 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.412942

Antonio Estache (Contact Author)

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
32 (0)2 6503838 (Phone)

Lourdes Trujillo-Castellano

Departamento de Analisis Economico Aplicado ( email )

Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria
Campus de Tafira
Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Las Palmas 35017
Spain

University College of London (UCL)

Chadwick Building
Gower Street
London, London WC1E 6
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
714
Abstract Views
3,934
rank
35,097
PlumX Metrics