Private Merger Negotiation Responses to Ongoing Tax Legislation

48 Pages Posted: 14 Jun 2022 Last revised: 23 May 2023

See all articles by Alexander Edwards

Alexander Edwards

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Shane Heitzman

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Sandy Klasa

University of Arizona - Department of Finance

Maximilian Todtenhaupt

Leibniz University Hannover; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)

Date Written: July 02, 2024

Abstract

Target valuation hinges on expected after-tax cash flows. But how do buyers and sellers adapt when future tax laws are uncertain or developing? Using hand-collected data, we examine the impact of tax policy developments on contemporaneous private merger negotiations surrounding U.S. corporate tax reform legislation in 2017. During the tax legislation period, bidders raise their offer prices relative to their initial bids when the target's expected gain from reform is high. The bidder's response to the target's gain from tax reform is concentrated in deals with competing bidders, when the target has a higher quality management team, or when the target's CEO is more involved in negotiations. When the target CEO is involved, the bidder's response to expected tax gains is strongest when the target CEO's incentives are more aligned with other shareholders. Individual bid increases in response to expected tax gains occur shortly after legislative events.

Keywords: taxes, mergers, acquisitions, uncertainty, policy JEL Codes: G34, G38, H2

JEL Classification: G34, G38, H25, H26

Suggested Citation

Edwards, Alexander S. and Heitzman, Shane and Klasa, Sandy and Todtenhaupt, Maximilian, Private Merger Negotiation Responses to Ongoing Tax Legislation (July 02, 2024). Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 4130342, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4130342 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4130342

Alexander S. Edwards

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada

Shane Heitzman

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA California 90089
United States

Sandy Klasa (Contact Author)

University of Arizona - Department of Finance ( email )

McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
520-621-8761 (Phone)

Maximilian Todtenhaupt

Leibniz University Hannover ( email )

Königsworther Platz 1
Hannover, 30167
Germany

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, NO-5045
Norway

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/todtenhaupt

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