School Choice and Parental Satisfaction with Curriculum: National Evidence from a Large Virtual Charter School Operator

24 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2022

See all articles by Corey DeAngelis

Corey DeAngelis

American Federation for Children; Cato Institute; Reason Foundation

Date Written: June 7, 2022

Abstract

Access to virtual public charter schools might improve the match between school curriculum and parental values. This study uses national survey data to examine the degree to which parents agree that schools meet their needs when it comes to the curriculum. Regression analyses indicate that parents with children enrolled in virtual charter schools are substantially more likely than parents with children enrolled in district-run public schools to “strongly agree” with nine measures of curriculum alignment, transparency, and control. For example, the fully specified model indicates that families with children in virtual charter schools are 20 percentage points more likely than families with children in district-run public schools to “strongly agree” that their child’s school teaches values that are consistent with their own. These results hold after controlling for student gender, race, grade level, state of residence, free-and-reduced-price lunch status, and parent political affiliation, and are robust to various analytic techniques and specifications.

Keywords: charter schools, school choice, parental values, school curriculum

JEL Classification: I28, I20

Suggested Citation

DeAngelis, Corey, School Choice and Parental Satisfaction with Curriculum: National Evidence from a Large Virtual Charter School Operator (June 7, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4130505 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4130505

Corey DeAngelis (Contact Author)

American Federation for Children ( email )

1020 19th St NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Cato Institute ( email )

1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001-5403
United States

Reason Foundation ( email )

1747 Connecticut Ave NW
Washington, DC 20009
United States

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