Proposed Changes to the Merger Guidelines’ Approach to Common Ownership

6 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2022

See all articles by Martin C. Schmalz

Martin C. Schmalz

CEPR; University of Oxford - Finance; CESifo; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: April 21, 2022

Abstract

I appreciate the opportunity to submit a comment in response to the FTC’s Request for Information on Merger Enforcement. This comment focuses on responding to Question 12.h of the Request, which asks whether changes should be made to the guidelines’ approach to common ownership and horizontal stockholding. I argue that recent evidence confirms the link between common ownership and anticompetitive effects and identifies a relevant causal mechanism. I then offer a new framework based in economics for evaluating policy proposals intended to address anticompetitive effects of common ownership. I conclude by calling for regulators to make data on corporate ownership more available so that the problem of common ownership can be further studied, and by calling for the FTC to incorporate “modified” HHIs into the guidelines to account for the effects of common and cross-ownership.

Keywords: common ownership, competition, governance, antitrust policy, regulation

JEL Classification: M12, L13, J33, G32, D21, L21

Suggested Citation

Schmalz, Martin C. and Schmalz, Martin C., Proposed Changes to the Merger Guidelines’ Approach to Common Ownership (April 21, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4130829 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4130829

Martin C. Schmalz (Contact Author)

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

University of Oxford - Finance ( email )

United States

CESifo ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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