Monitoring, Metering and Menger: A Conciliatory Basis for a Genuine Institutional Economics

The Review of Austrian Economics, Forthcoming

GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 22-31

36 Pages Posted: 14 Jun 2022 Last revised: 9 Nov 2022

See all articles by Peter J. Boettke

Peter J. Boettke

George Mason University - Department of Economics; Mercatus Center at George Mason University

Rosolino Candela

George Mason University - Mercatus Center; University Francisco Marroquín

Date Written: June 8, 2022

Abstract

Carl Menger’s objective in his seminal book, Principles of Economics, was to elucidate a unified account of price formation. This raises a question, which motivates our paper: to what extent, if any, can Menger account for production not directly organized by the price mechanism, and therefore a theory of economic organization and its formation through time? We argue that implicit to Menger’s account of price formation is an account not only of institutional formation, but particularly economic organization. Thus, there exists a symbiotic relationship that can be found in Menger between a theory of price formation and a theory of organizational formation, both of which are by-products of an increasing division of knowledge brought about by an increasing scope of market exchange. Moreover, our point illustrates that Menger’s work is an analytical point of departure for a shared understanding of parallel developments in Austrian economics and organizational economics that have followed.

Keywords: Carl Menger; Economic Organization

JEL Classification: B31; B53; L14; L23

Suggested Citation

Boettke, Peter J. and Boettke, Peter J. and Candela, Rosolino, Monitoring, Metering and Menger: A Conciliatory Basis for a Genuine Institutional Economics (June 8, 2022). The Review of Austrian Economics, Forthcoming, GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 22-31, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4131606

Peter J. Boettke

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Mercatus Center at George Mason University ( email )

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Rosolino Candela (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

University Francisco Marroquín ( email )

Street Manuel F. Ayau (6 Final Street), Zone 10
01010
Guatemala

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