Delegated Philanthropy in Mutual Fund Votes on Climate Change Externalities

ISTE SCIENCE PUBLISHING LTD, May 2022

27 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2022

See all articles by Marie Briere

Marie Briere

Amundi Asset Management; Paris Dauphine University; Université Libre de Bruxelles

Sebastien Pouget

Toulouse School of Economics

Martin C. Schmalz

CEPR; University of Oxford - Finance; CESifo; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Loredana Ureche-Rangau

Université de Picardie Jules Verne, LEFMI

Date Written: May 2022

Abstract

This chapter studies the votes of institutional investors on shareholder resolutions instructing corporations to mitigate climate change externalities. Our sample includes 238 US fund families that voted on 14,409 different shareholder resolutions at 2,700 companies over the period from 2013 to 2016. We find that, in line with the delegated philanthropy logic, fund families that have larger proportions of responsible investments display a larger support for resolutions on climate change. This result holds i) especially for fund families with large percentage of SRI, ii) whether ISS favors or not these resolutions, iii) when these resolutions end up being close call votes, and iv) when we focus only on fund families that have voted more than 50 or 100 resolutions on environmental and social issues.

Keywords: Climate change externalities, Delegated philantropy, Mutual Fund Families, Voting

JEL Classification: G11, F21, G23

Suggested Citation

Briere, Marie and Pouget, Sebastien and Schmalz, Martin C. and Schmalz, Martin C. and Ureche-Rangau, Loredana, Delegated Philanthropy in Mutual Fund Votes on Climate Change Externalities (May 2022). ISTE SCIENCE PUBLISHING LTD, May 2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4133799 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4133799

Marie Briere

Amundi Asset Management ( email )

90 Boulevard Pasteur
Paris, 75015
France

Paris Dauphine University ( email )

Université Libre de Bruxelles ( email )

Brussels
Belgium

Sebastien Pouget

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

21 allée de Brienne
31015 Toulouse Cedex 6
France

Martin C. Schmalz

CEPR ( email )

London
United Kingdom

University of Oxford - Finance ( email )

United States

CESifo ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Loredana Ureche-Rangau (Contact Author)

Université de Picardie Jules Verne, LEFMI ( email )

10 placette Lafleur, BP 2716
Amiens Cedex 1, 80027
France

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