Can Electoral Mobility Diminish Economic Performance? Evidence from the Us Telecommunications Sector

50 Pages Posted: 31 Jul 2003

Date Written: October 11, 2005

Abstract

Electoral mobility (i.e., individuals' propensity to vote in elections) is popularly cited as reflecting a polity's health. Increased mobility can, however, diminish economic performance. For example, while mobile electorates can check producer monopolies, they can also facilitate consumer monopsonies and weaken regulatory commitments. Looking at a relatively controlled setting (i.e., the US local exchange sector), I find evidence that electoral mobility may have diminished economic performance through such channels. Moreover, I encounter considerable difficulty when attempting to dismiss this evidence as either an artifact of endogeneity bias or as support for an alternative normative inference.

Keywords: Electoral Institutions, Voter Turnout, Regulatory Capture, Regulatory Commitment, Telecommunications Policy, Economic Performance

JEL Classification: D72, D78, L96

Suggested Citation

Falaschetti, Dino, Can Electoral Mobility Diminish Economic Performance? Evidence from the Us Telecommunications Sector (October 11, 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=413583 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.413583

Dino Falaschetti (Contact Author)

U.S. House of Representatives ( email )

Committee on Financial Services
2129 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC District of Columbia 20515
United States

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