Control Aversion in Hierarchies

28 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2022

See all articles by Alessandro De Chiara

Alessandro De Chiara

Central European University (CEU) - Department of Economics; University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona - Barcelona Economic Analysis Team (BEAT)

Florian Engl

University of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Holger Herz

University of Fribourg - Department of Economics

Ester Manna

University of Barcelona

Date Written: 2022

Abstract

Companies typically control various aspects of their workers’ behaviors. In this paper, we investigate whether the hierarchical distance of the superior who imposes such control measures matters for the workers’ ensuing reaction. In particular, we test, in a laboratory experiment, whether potential negative behavioral reactions to imposed control are larger when they are implemented by a direct superior rather than a hierarchically more distant superior. We find that hierarchical proximity indeed magnifies such control aversion and discuss several potential channels for this result.

Keywords: control aversion, hierarchies, delegation, principal-agent-problem

JEL Classification: C920, D230, M120

Suggested Citation

De Chiara, Alessandro and Engl, Florian and Herz, Holger and Manna, Ester, Control Aversion in Hierarchies (2022). CESifo Working Paper No. 9779, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4136944 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4136944

Alessandro De Chiara (Contact Author)

Central European University (CEU) - Department of Economics ( email )

Nador u. 9.
Budapest H-1051
Hungary

University of Barcelona ( email )

Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes, 585
Barcelona, 08007
Spain

University of Barcelona - Barcelona Economic Analysis Team (BEAT) ( email )

Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes
Barcelona, 08007
Spain

Florian Engl

University of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 31
D-93040 Regensburg
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Holger Herz

University of Fribourg - Department of Economics ( email )

Fribourg
Switzerland

Ester Manna

University of Barcelona ( email )

Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes, 585
Barcelona, 08007
Spain

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