Will Zero Vulnerability Computing (Zvc) Ever Be Possible? Testing the Hypothesis

Abstract

Life without computers is unimaginable. However, computers remain vulnerable to cybercrimes, an exponentially growing $6 trillion industry that the world has come to accept as “necessary evil.” Third-party permissions resulting in an attack surface (AS) and in-computer storage that computers mandate are the two key design elements that hackers exploit: the former by remote malware installation, and the latter by stealing personal data using authentication faking techniques. In legacy computers, neither AS can be completely eliminated nor can a connected device store data offline. These evil necessities render fool-proof cybersecurity impossible. Although the architects of legacy computers made perfectly reasonable engineering trade-offs for their world, our world is very different. ZVC (Zero Vulnerability Computing) challenges the impossible with two new rules that design a hardware component, ICOS (In-Computer Offline Storage) and a software component, Supra OS (SOS), to deliver a comprehensive protection against vulnerabilities. We demonstrate the feasibility of ZVC in a minimalist milieu of a tiny form-factor NAND chipset that’s permanently mounted on a host computer as a hardware wallet, providing the first evidence of complete obliteration of AS. In the restricted environment of the experiment, neither malware could infect the ZVC device due to a lack of AS, nor personal data could be hacked as it mostly remained offline, except for sporadic processing. Further research should explore whether ZVC can fully secure computers in more complex real-world scenarios and open a new epoch in the evolution of computers.

Keywords: Cybercrimes, cybersecurity, computer vulnerabilities, attack surface, computer architecture, IoT