Prodigals and Projecture: An Economic History of Usury Laws in the United States from Colonial Times to 1900

58 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2003 Last revised: 15 Aug 2022

See all articles by Hugh Rockoff

Hugh Rockoff

Newark College of Arts & Sciences - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: June 2003

Abstract

During the Colonial era usury laws in the United States were strict both in terms of the maximum rate that could be charged and the penalties that would be imposed. In Massachusetts in eighteenth century, for example, the maximum rate was 6 percent, and both principal and interest were forfeited if usury could be proved against the lender. The laws were eased during the early national period, and in many states they were repealed, although the United States never completely abandoned its system of usury laws. By 1870, when a limited reaction set in, the liberalization had reached the point where the great bulk of commercial transactions must have been largely unaffected by the usury laws, at least in non-crisis years. Two factors seem to have been paramount in producing the liberalization: changes in ideas about the effectiveness of government regulation in general and about the effectiveness of usury laws in particular, and competition among the states for capital. This history suggests that the usury laws, when tightly drawn, may have had a larger impact than economic historians have generally recognized.

Suggested Citation

Rockoff, Hugh T., Prodigals and Projecture: An Economic History of Usury Laws in the United States from Colonial Times to 1900 (June 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w9742, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=414242

Hugh T. Rockoff (Contact Author)

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